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ABSTRACT: Exploring intentionality from an externalist per-
spective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of 
seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respec-
tively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and 
then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I 
then critically explore some important consequences that follow 
from granting that (i) there are transparent and translucent in-
tentional states and (ii) these intentional states are mental states. 
These consequences include: first, that existential opacity is 
neither the mark of intentionality nor of the mental; second, that 
Sellars has not shown that all intentionality is non-relational; 
third, that a key Quinean argument for semantic indeterminacy 
rests on a false premise; fourth, that perceptual experience is 
intentional on Alston’s Theory of Appearing; fifth, that either 
some mental causation is more than internal physiological 
causation or some mental states are epiphenomenal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ne of the most significant developments in the philosophy of mind over the 
past thirty years has been the rise of externalism. This thesis, also known as 
anti-individualism, holds that at least some mental states do not supervene solely 
on contemporaneous bodily states. Though a lively debate persists over whether 
externalism is true, a growing literature has arisen exploring what follows if it is 
true. Topics explored in this vein have included knowledge in general and self-
knowledge in particular, skepticism, perception, and psychological methodology, 
among others. This paper pursues this line of inquiry by exploring the topic of 
intentionality from an externalist perspective.
O
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With any inquiry that explores what follows if a given thesis is true, those who 
reject the thesis may also reject its consequences. Even so, an exploratory inquiry 
of this kind may prove philosophically interesting not only to those sympathetic 
to the thesis, but also to those unsympathetic or uncommitted to it, insofar as the 
inquiry allows them to judge the thesis by its fruit. Taken in this light, my explora-
tion of intentionality from an externalist perspective may prove interesting not only 
to externalists, but also to internalists and to the uncommitted.
My inquiry will be pursued as follows. In section II, I elucidate how external-
ism and internalism will be understood for the purposes of this paper. In section 
III, the topic of intentionality is addressed. In contrast with most discussions of 
intentionality, which focus (often exclusively) on the intentionality of propositional 
attitudes such as beliefs, hopes, desires, and the like, my discussion begins with the 
intentionality of seeing. Synthesizing distinctions concerning the nature of seeing 
drawn by Ryle, Kim, and Dretske, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality, which 
we may call transparent, translucent, and opaque, respectively. I then extend the 
distinction from seeing to knowing, showing how this three-fold distinction sub-
sumes Russell’s distinction between knowledge of things (by acquaintance) and 
knowledge of truths. I then further extend the distinction to belief. 
Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then explore in section IV some 
important consequences that follow from granting (i) that there are transparent 
and translucent intentional states, and (ii) that these intentional states are mental 
states. These consequences include: first, that intentional inexistence (as this notion 
is commonly understood) is neither the mark of intentionality nor of the mental; 
second, that Sellars has not shown that all intentionality is non-relational; third, 
that a key Quinean argument for semantic indeterminacy rests on a false premise; 
fourth, that perceptual experience is intentional on Alston’s Theory of Appearing, 
even though he denies that it bears the standard marks of intentionality; fifth, that 
either some mental causation is more than (internal) physiological causation or 
some mental states are epiphenomenal. 
II. INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM
For the purposes of this paper, internalism will be understood as the thesis that 
all mental states supervene solely on contemporaneous bodily states, and conse-
quently that no mental state is essentially relational, where relata include objects 
or states of affairs in the subject’s extra-bodily environment. States (such as seeing 
or knowing) that involve relations to objects or states of affairs in the extra-bodily 
environment will, on internalism, be classified as hybrid states composed of (i) an 
intrinsic, mental component (supervening solely on contemporaneous bodily states), 
and (ii) an extrinsic, non-mental component (a relation to one or more objects or 
states of affairs in the subject’s extra-bodily environment).
Externalism will be understood here as the thesis that at least some mental 
states do not supervene solely on contemporaneous bodily states, and that at least 
some mental states are essentially relational where relata include objects or states 
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of affairs in the subject’s extra-bodily environment. Unlike the internalist, the 
externalist holds that at least some states (such as seeing or knowing) that involve 
relations to objects or states of affairs in the extra-bodily environment are not hybrid 
but genuine mental states. In other words, the externalist will count as genuinely 
mental at least some states that involve relations to objects or states of affairs in 
the extra-bodily environment, and do so without factoring out a separate, purely 
internal component as what is genuinely mental.
With this distinction now drawn, we turn in the next section to the topic of in-
tentionality, which we will approach from an externalist perspective. By “externalist 
perspective,” I mean a perspective that does not assume the truth of internalism from 
the get-go, but rather that accepts the tenets of externalism as delineated above.
III. THREE KINDS OF INTENTIONALITY1
Intentionality is the property of being about, or directed at, something. From an 
externalist perspective, the intentionality of perception, and of seeing in particular, 
provides a useful starting point for a discussion of intentionality more generally. 
Synthesizing distinctions drawn by Ryle, Kim, and Dretske, we may differentiate 
objectual from factive seeing, and literal from figurative factive seeing.
Seeing an object (or touching, smelling, tasting, or hearing it) is an intentional 
state in that it is about, or directed at, something.2 For example, if Sarah sees a tree, 
her state of seeing is about or directed at a tree. Following Ryle (1949), we may 
categorize Sarah’s seeing a tree as a perceptual success state.3 In Ryle’s words:
Verbs of perception such as “see,” “hear,” “detect,” “discriminate” and 
many others are generally used to record observational successes, while 
verbs like “watch,” “listen,” “probe,” “scan and “savour” are used to record 
observational undertakings, the success of which may still be in question. 
. . . The simple-seeming assertion “I see a linnet” claims a success, where 
“I am trying to make out what is moving” reports only an investigation. . . . 
The words “perception” and “perceive” . . . cover only achievements, as do 
the specific verbs of perception “see,” “hear,” “taste,” “smell” and, in one 
sense, “feel.” (222–223) 
A key feature of a perceptual success state, such as seeing or touching an object, 
is that one sees or touches it only if it exists.4 As Kim notes: “I cannot see or touch 
a tree unless a tree exists, and I cannot see or touch this particular tree unless this 
particular tree exists” (1993, 186).5 To be sure, one can figuratively “see” a tree in 
the sense of hallucinating one, but one can literally see a tree only if it exists.6 
Seeing (or touching) objects or things is not the only kind of perceptual success 
state. Dretske and others emphasize that we can also see facts about things. For 
instance, Sarah may see a rabbit, and also see facts about it (e.g., that it is white, 
that it is fidgety, that it is furry, and the like). Failing to see a fact about an object, 
however, does not entail that one fails to see the object. Consider Dretske’s example 
of a child who, while glancing at a sofa, mistakes a black cat for an old sweater:
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Though the child does not recognize the cat (as a cat), she must, in some 
sense, see the cat in order to mistake it for a sweater. Nevertheless, though 
the child sees a black cat on the sofa, sees an object fitting the description, 
she does not realize that this is a correct description of what she sees. She 
thereby fails to see the corresponding fact: that there is a black cat on the 
sofa. She sees an object (the black cat on the sofa), but not the fact (that there 
is a black cat on the sofa) corresponding to it. (1990, 131)
Building on these points of Ryle, Kim, and Dretske, we may distinguish between 
(at least) two kinds of perceptual success state: objectual seeing (seeing objects or 
events) and factive seeing (seeing facts about objects or events). Each is intentional 
in the sense of being about or directed at something. Each is also what we may call 
“existentially transparent” (or de re) in the sense that the ascription of each licenses 
an existential generalization. That is, if Subject S sees object o, it follows that o 
exists; and, if Subject S sees that object o is F (where F is some characteristic of 
o, and where “that object o is F ” refers to some fact about o), it also follows that 
o exists. In fact, a necessary condition for a state to qualify as a perceptual success 
state is that the state be genuinely relational: S sees o or sees that o is F only if o 
exists. Moreover, if o is external to S’s body, then S’s seeing o or seeing that o is F 
cannot supervene solely on S’s contemporaneous bodily states.7
However, objectual seeing is what we may call “referentially transparent,” 
whereas factive seeing is what we may call “referentially opaque.” Objectual seeing 
is referentially transparent in the sense that the ascription of such a state admits 
of substitution of co-referring terms without change in truth-value. Alternatively 
put, if subject S sees a, and a = b, then S sees b, whether or not S realizes that she 
is seeing b or realizes that a = b. For instance, if Sarah sees the Sultan of Brunei, 
then Sarah sees the richest monarch in the world, provided that the Sultan of Brunei 
is the richest monarch in the world. 
By contrast, factive seeing, though existentially transparent like objectual see-
ing, is referentially opaque in the sense that the substitution of co-referring terms 
in the ascription of such a state may result in a change in truth-value. Alternatively 
put, unless a subject S realizes or is aware that a = b, S may see that a is F without 
seeing that b is F (or vice-versa) even if a = b. For instance, if Sarah does not real-
ize (or know, or even believe) that the Sultan of Brunei is the richest monarch in 
the world and hence does not recognize or identify him as the richest monarch in 
the world, then even if it is true that Sarah sees that the Sultan of Brunei is at the 
lectern and even if it is true that the Sultan of Brunei is the richest monarch in the 
world, it may still be false that Sarah sees that the richest monarch in the world is 
at the lectern. Consequently, factive seeing is referentially opaque even though it 
is existentially transparent or de re.
We considered above the use of “S seeing that o is F ” in what we might call 
“the literal visual sense,” where it implies that S objectually sees o. For ease of 
reference, let us call such states of factive seeing “states of visual factive seeing.” 
There is, by contrast, a figurative, non-visual sense of “S seeing that o is F ” that 
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does not imply that S objectually sees o, and is used in the wider sense of “real-
izing or understanding that o is F.” Let us call these states of factive seeing “states 
of non-visual factive seeing.” In this connection, two kinds of non-visual factive 
seeing are worth distinguishing.
To understand the first, consider the example of a blind boy seeing that (in the 
figurative sense of realizing or understanding that) his new puppy is a beagle. This 
state is presumably intentional in the sense that it is directed at something, namely, 
the fact that his new puppy is a beagle. Like states of visual factive seeing, it is 
existentially transparent (de re) in the sense that it licenses an existential generaliza-
tion (e.g., the blind boy’s seeing that his new beagle is a puppy entails that his new 
puppy exists), and it is also referentially opaque in that substitution of co-referring 
terms may lead to a change in truth-value (e.g., though it may be true that the blind 
boy sees that his new puppy is a beagle, if he does not know that his new puppy is 
the fourth puppy of the litter of his Aunt Sarah’s dog, it may be false that he sees 
that the fourth puppy of the litter of his Aunt Sarah’s dog is a beagle).
In contrast with the example above, consider the example of a blind boy see-
ing that (in the figurative sense of realizing or understanding that) Santa Claus is 
Kris Kringle. This state is presumably intentional in the sense that it is directed at 
something, and if we countenance the existence of (non-Russellian) propositions, 
we may say that it is directed at the proposition “Santa Claus is Kris Kringle.” In 
contrast with the first kind of non-visual factive seeing and with visual factive see-
ing, the ascription of such a state is both existentially and referentially opaque. It 
is existentially opaque (not de re) in the sense that it does not license an existential 
generalization (e.g., the blind boy’s seeing that Santa Claus is Kris Kringle does 
not entail that Santa Claus or Kris Kringle exists). It is also referentially opaque 
in that substitution of co-referring terms may lead to a change in truth-value (e.g., 
though it may be true that the blind boy sees that Santa Claus is Kris Kringle, it 
may be false that the blind boy sees that Saint Nick is Kris Kringle).
Let us call the first kind of non-visual factive seeing “non-fictive non-visual 
factive seeing,” and the second “fictive non-visual factive seeing.” Instances of the 
first kind involve actual facts about actual objects, instances of the second involve 
fictive facts about fictive objects.8
Though states of objectual seeing, visual factive seeing, and non-fictive non-vi-
sual factive seeing cannot supervene solely on a subject’s contemporaneous bodily 
states when they involve a relation to an actual object external to the subject’s body, 
states of fictive non-visual factive seeing may supervene in this way, since they 
involve no relation to an actual extra-bodily object.
Let us now generalize. We may characterize as a transparent intentional state 
any state meeting each of the following three conditions: (a) it is about, or directed 
at, something; (b) the ascription of such a state is existentially transparent; and (c) 
the ascription of such a state is referentially transparent. A transparent intentional 
state is thus transparent in two respects. We may take objectual seeing as a paradigm 
example of a transparent intentional state.
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We may characterize as a translucent intentional state any state meeting each 
of the following three conditions: (a) it is about, or directed at, something; (b) 
the ascription of such a state is existentially transparent; and (c) the ascription of 
such a state is referentially opaque.9 A translucent intentional state is thus trans-
parent in one respect but opaque in another.10 We may take visual factive seeing 
and non-fictive non-visual factive seeing as paradigm examples of a translucent 
intentional state.
We may characterize as an opaque intentional state any state meeting each of 
the following three conditions: (a) it is about, or directed at, something; (b) the 
ascription of such a state is existentially opaque; and (c) the ascription of such a 
state is referentially opaque. An opaque intentional state is thus opaque in two 
respects. We may take fictive non-visual factive seeing as a paradigm example of 
an opaque intentional state.
IV. EXTENDING THE DISTINCTION
Having distinguished three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, we turn 
next to the intentionality of knowledge and of belief.
KNOWLEDGE
To know is to know something. To be in a state of knowledge is to be in a state 
that is about, or directed at, something. Hence, to be in a state of knowledge is to be 
in an intentional state. In this connection, consider the familiar epistemic distinction 
between objectual knowledge (i.e., knowledge of a concrete particular; e.g., Sarah’s 
knowing Martin) and factive knowledge (i.e., knowledge that such and such is the 
case; e.g., Sarah’s knowing that Martin is her cousin).11 The distinction between 
objectual and factive knowledge is akin to the distinction Russell drew between 
knowledge of things (by acquaintance) and knowledge of truths, albeit without the 
Russellian doctrine that the only possible objects of knowledge by acquaintance 
are sense-data—non-physical objects of immediate awareness.12
In light of our distinction, objectual knowledge may be characterized as a trans-
parent intentional state in being both existentially and referentially transparent: if 
S objectually knows a, then (i) a exists, and (ii) if a = b, then S knows b, even if S 
does not realize or know that she knows b or that a = b. For instance, if Sarah knows 
Masaru Hayami, then she knows the present Governor of the Bank of Japan, even 
if she does not realize that she knows the present Governor of the Bank of Japan 
or that Mr. Hayami is the present Governor of the Bank of Japan. 
By contrast with objectual knowledge, some instances of factive knowledge 
are translucently intentional (and involve actual facts about actual objects) while 
others are opaquely intentional (and involve fictive facts about fictive objects). 
As an example of translucently intentional factive knowledge, consider Sarah’s 
(non-fictive) knowledge that Mr. Hayami lives in Tokyo. The ascription of such 
knowledge to her is existentially transparent (or de re) in that it licenses the 
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existential generalization that Mr. Hayami exists, but it is also referentially opaque 
in that substitution of co-referring terms may result in a change in truth-value. For 
instance, even if Sarah knows that Mr. Hayami lives in Tokyo, she might not know 
that the present Governor of the Bank of Japan lives in Tokyo if she does not know 
that Mr. Hayami is the present Governor of the Bank of Japan. 
As an example of opaquely intentional factive knowledge, consider Sarah’s 
(fictive) knowledge that Santa Claus is a jolly fat man from the North Pole. The 
ascription of such knowledge to her is existentially opaque in that it fails to license 
the existential generalization that Santa Claus exists. It is also referentially opaque 
in that, even if Sarah knows that Santa Claus is a jolly fat man from the North Pole, 
if she does not know that Santa Claus is Kris Kringle, she might not know that Kris 
Kringle is a jolly fat man from the North Pole.
In terms of supervenience, though states of objectual knowing and states of 
translucently intentional factive knowing cannot supervene solely on a subject’s 
contemporaneous bodily states when they involve a relation to an extra-bodily 
object, states of opaquely intentional factive knowing may supervene in this way 
since they do not involve such a relation.
BELIEF
Consider the distinction between belief de re and belief de dicto. As Kim puts 
it: “Roughly speaking, de dicto belief is believing a certain proposition, a dictum, 
to be true, while de re belief is believing of some object, a res, that it is so and so” 
(1993, 185). Defining “internal state” as meaning neither rooted outside times at 
which it is had, nor outside the objects that have it, Kim notes:
Beliefs de dicto will in general be internal states. The belief that the tallest 
man in the world is a spy does not entail the existence of a tall man or a spy; 
the belief that ghosts are malevolent does not entail the existence of ghosts. 
On the other hand, belief de re is plausibly viewed as noninternal when the 
object of belief is other than oneself. If a given belief is de re with respect 
to a certain object, then this object must exist if that de re belief is to exist. 
You cannot have a belief about Mt. Everest unless Mt. Everest existsBand 
unless, furthermore, you are in a certain historical-cognitive relation to it. 
(1993, 185)
Kim adds that if internal states supervene (solely) on contemporaneous bodily 
states whereas noninternal states do not, then belief de re is not supervenient in 
this way when the object of belief is other than oneself, whereas belief de dicto 
is (1993, 185).
Put in our terms of existential transparency and existential opacity, belief de re 
is existentially transparent whereas belief de dicto is existentially opaque (and put 
more generally, an opaque intentional state since it is also referentially opaque).13 
The following question then naturally arises: Is belief de re also referentially 
transparent and hence a transparent intentional state, or is it referentially opaque 
and hence a translucent intentional state?
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If we side with Quine (1966) to the extent that we take referential transpar-
ency (and the substitutivity that goes with it) to go hand in hand with existential 
transparency, then we will take belief de re to be (in our terms) transparently 
intentional.14 
By contrast, suppose we agree with Burge (1977; cf. Elgin 1985; and Kaplan 
1998) that in at least some cases a belief de re may (in our terms) be existentially 
transparent and yet referentially opaque. As Burge puts it:
For example, we may say, “Alfred believes that the man in the corner is a 
spy.” We may refuse unlimited substitution of terms denoting the man in the 
corner on the grounds that Alfred’s belief involves thinking of the fellow in 
the corner and not, say, as the firstborn in Kiev in 1942. Yet we may also be 
intending in our ascription to relate Alfred de re to the man to whom we refer 
with the expression “the man in the corner.” In short, the term “the man in 
the corner” may be doing double duty at the surface level—both character-
izing Alfred’s conception and picking out the relevant res. It would be ill 
considered to count this simply a case of de dicto belief. (1977, 341)
To side with Burge, then, entails holding that at least some beliefs de re are (in our 
terms) translucently intentional.
Though my sympathies lie with Burge, my aim here is not to argue that his 
view should be accepted over Quine’s. My point, rather, is that distinguishing 
between transparent and translucent intentionality provides us with a useful way 
of representing a basic disagreement over belief de re, and to locate it within the 
broader context of intentionality taken more generally.15 
TAKING STOCK 
From an externalist perspective, I distinguished between three kinds of intention-
ality in the case of seeing, and extended this three-fold distinction to knowledge and 
to belief. Approaching it from this perspective has enabled us to take intentionality to 
be a genus of which there are three main species, and hence to reject the traditional 
identification of intentionality with opaque intentionality. In the next section, I turn 
to some examples of how this three-fold distinction makes a difference.
V. SOME WAYS IN WHICH THE  
DISTINCTION MAKES A DIFFERENCE
In this section, I argue that, if one grants (i) that there are transparent and trans-
lucent intentional states, and (ii) that these intentional states are genuine mental 
states, a number of important consequences follow.
INTENTIONALITY AS THE MARK OF THE MENTAL
Three theses commonly credited to Brentano, the first two of which entail the 
third, may be summarized as follows:16
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Thesis 1. Intentional inexistence is the mark of intentionality.
Thesis 2. Intentionality is the mark of the mental.
Thesis 3. Intentional inexistence is the mark of the mental.
A widespread interpretation of Brentano takes his notion of intentional inexistence 
to be that of existential opacity, an interpretation that, exegesis-wise, is probably 
incorrect.17 In any case, understanding intentional inexistence as existential opac-
ity is philosophically interesting in its own right. So we will do so in light of our 
three-fold distinction. 
Put in our terms, the first thesis takes existential opacity to be what distinguishes 
the intentional from the non-intentional. If there are genuinely mental transparent 
and translucent intentional states, however, intentional inexistence or existential 
opacity cannot be the mark of intentionality per se, but only of opaque intentionality. 
The mark of intentionality is aboutness or directedness, but aboutness or directed-
ness is not co-extensive with intentional inexistence. If so, the first thesis is false.
The second thesis may be put as follows:18 
2a. Anything mental is intentional.
2b. Only something mental is intentional.
2c. Nothing physical is intentional.
In light of our three-fold distinction, the second thesis can be taken in at least four 
ways. One we may call the Opaque Intentionality Interpretation:
2.1a. Anything mental is opaquely intentional.
2.1b. Only something mental is opaquely intentional.
2.1c. Nothing physical is opaquely intentional.
If we take transparent and translucent intentional states to be genuine mental states, 
however, sub-thesis 2.1a of the above interpretation is false.
Moreover, if we take opaque intentional states to be mental states, the cor-
responding (i.e., the first) sub-thesis of the following two interpretations is also 
false:
The Transparent Intentionality Interpretation:
2.2a. Anything mental is transparently intentional.
2.2b. Only something mental is transparently intentional.
2.2c. Nothing physical is transparently intentional.
The Translucent Intentionality Interpretation:
2.3a. Anything mental is translucently intentional.
2.3b. Only something mental is translucently intentional.
2.3c. Nothing physical is translucently intentional.
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Only the following interpretation of the second thesis allows us to recognize 
that transparent, translucent, and opaque intentional states all count as genuine 
mental states:
The Disjunctive Interpretation:
2.4a. Anything mental is transparently, translucently, or opaquely intentional.
2.4b. Only something mental is transparently, translucently, or opaquely 
intentional.
2.4c. Nothing physical is transparently, translucently, or opaquely intentional.
Turning now to the third thesis, we may conclude the following. If transparent 
and translucent intentional states are genuine mental states, then since none of 
them involves intentional inexistence, it follows that, contra this thesis, intentional 
inexistence is not the mark of the mental.
HAS SELLARS SHOWN THAT INTENTIONALITY IS  
NON-RELATIONAL?
Wilfred Sellars famously argued in his remarkable paper “Being and Being 
Known” (1963a) that intentionality is non-relational. His argument may be put thus. 
Consider an intentional state such as thinking of a golden mountain. No golden 
mountain exists in the real order. But if intentionality is genuinely relational, then 
the thinker must be related to something. And what could that something be? Only 
two unsatisfactory answers (thought Sellars) present themselves: the Cartesian 
answer and the Extreme Realist answer.
According to the Cartesian answer, the relatum in question is a content having 
being-for-mind (or objective being in the scholastic sense). “Thus the thought of 
a golden mountain is a thought which is related to a golden mountain qua having 
being-for-mind, being for the mind that is thinking of it” (1963a, 41). Sellars re-
jected this answer on the ground that postulating a domain of contents mediating 
between the mind and the real order fosters skepticism and idealism.
According to the Extreme Realist answer, the relatum in question is not some 
content mediating between the mind and the real order, but rather an item of the 
real order. On the Extreme Realist conception, the real order contains “subsistent” 
non-existent objects which serve as relata of intentional states. Sellars rejected this 
answer too on account of its ontological extremism.
Having found untenable the aforementioned versions of the relational concep-
tion of intentionality, Sellars concluded that intentionality is non-relational on the 
assumption that he had eliminated the alternative possibilities.19 In this connec-
tion, we may ask ourselves whether this Sellarsian argument establishes that all 
intentionality is non-relational. If we recognize the existence of transparent and 
translucent intentional states, the answer is no: Sellars presupposed the traditional 
identification of intentionality with opaque intentionality, and this identification, 
from the perspective of the externalist account of intentionality developed here, 
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conflates a genus with one of its species. Even if we suppose that the existential 
opacity of opaque intentionality gives us reason to doubt whether the latter is 
genuinely relational, it gives us no reason whatever to doubt that transparent inten-
tionality and translucent intentionality, each of which is existentially transparent, 
are genuinely relational. In sum, even if we were to suppose that Sellars succeeded 
in showing that opaque intentionality is non-relational, he would not have thereby 
shown that transparent intentionality or translucent intentionality (and hence that 
all intentionality) is non-relational.20
Interestingly, if one shares Sellars’s distaste for postulating a domain of contents 
mediating between the mind and the real order or his distaste for “subsistent” non-
existent objects, but if one also recognizes the existence of transparent and trans-
lucent intentional states, the following argument may be generated for supposing 
that putatively opaque intentional states are not genuinely intentional:
1. In order for a state to be genuinely directed at, or about, something (and so 
be intentional), it must be genuinely relational and so have a relatum in the 
real order.
2. But putatively opaque intentional states are not genuinely relational since 
they have no relatum in the real order.
3. Hence, putatively opaque intentional states are not genuinely intentional.
If this argument is sound, then “opaque” intentionality is at best a kind of pseudo-
intentionality.
SEMANTIC INDETERMINACY AND QUINE’S RESPONSE TO 
ALSTON’S OBJECTION
To Quine’s thesis about the radical indeterminacy of translation, Alston (1998) 
objected (among other things) that physics and semantics are on par methodologi-
cally in terms of underdetermination of theory by data. Given this methodological 
symmetry, Alston challenged Quine on why he thought that there is indeterminacy 
(no fact of the matter) in semantics but not in physics. For if underdetermination 
is compatible with truth and determinacy in the case of physics, why isn’t it also 
in the case of semantics?
In response, Quine conceded the methodological symmetry. As Quine put it: “In 
my view, as in his [Alston’s], the underdetermination of both disciplines is quite 
on par methodologically” (1988, 73). Quine claimed that the relevant asymmetry 
between physics and semantics lies elsewhere. To wit, in the case of semantics:
We can agree, I hope, that one’s command of language, one’s understand-
ing of language, one’s dispositions to respond, indeed one’s very thoughts, 
cannot differ from one moment to another without some difference, however 
undetectable, in the states of one’s physical organism. Call the doctrine 
materialism or psychophysical parallelism; either will do. Now the relation 
between the interchangeable but incompatible manuals of translation that 
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I have postulated is that they accord with exactly the same states of human 
organisms, however minutely modulated; all the same hidden states of 
nerves. This is the sense in which I say there is no fact of the matter. I am 
not talking of criteria, but of nature. (Ibid., 74–75)
Notice that Quine’s reply presupposes that one’s mental states supervene 
solely on one’s bodily states: there is no change in one’s mental states without 
change in one’s bodily states.21 The core of his argument may be encapsulated 
as follows:
1. All one’s mental states supervene solely on one’s bodily states.
2.  If all one’s mental states supervene solely on one’s bodily states, then in-
terchangeable but incompatible manuals of translation accord with exactly 
the same bodily states.
3. If interchangeable but incompatible manuals of translation accord with 
exactly the same bodily states, there is no fact of the matter (hence radical 
indeterminacy) in semantics.
4. Hence, there is no fact of the matter (hence radical indeterminacy) in 
semantics.
If there are transparent and translucent intentional states, however, and if these 
states are mental because intentional, then Quine’s first premise is false. This is 
because transparent and translucent intentional states do not supervene solely on 
bodily states insofar as they are genuinely relational and include as relata one or 
more extra-bodily existents. What’s more, even if we supposed that this argument 
of Quine’s established radical indeterminacy in the case of opaque semanticity, it 
would fail to establish radical indeterminacy in the case of transparent or translucent 
semanticity. Even if radical indeterminacy were an ineluctable upshot of opaque 
semanticity, it would not follow that it is also an ineluctable upshot of translucent 
or transparent semanticity.
THE THEORY OF APPEARING AND INTENTIONALITY
Alston (1999) presents a forceful defense of the Theory of Appearing, a direct 
realist account of objectual perceptual experience (hereafter “perceptual experi-
ence”).22 On this theory, perceptual experience consists in an irreducible relation 
of appearing in which X appears P to S, where X is/are one or more physical 
objects, S is some subject, and P is/are one or more phenomenal characteristics. 
Given the way in which the Theory of Appearing takes perceptual experience 
not to supervene solely on contemporaneous bodily states and to be essentially 
relational, the theory is externalist as this term is understood here. Interestingly 
however, despite the fact that perceptual experience is clearly, on this theory, 
intentional in the generic sense of being about or directed at something, Alston 
claims that the X appears P to S relation constitutive of perceptual experience 
does not, as he puts it,
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bear the usual marks of an “intentional” relation. For one thing, if X appears 
P to S, and X = Y, it follows that Y appears P to S. The relation is refreshingly 
transparent. And more to the present point, X appears P to S entails that X 
exists. No “intentional inexistence” here. This is a relation that requires two 
actually existing terms. Nothing can look a certain way to me unless it is 
“there” to look that way. I can’t be directly aware of something that doesn’t 
exist. (1999, 191)
Notice that Alston’s denial that the X appears P to S relation bears the “usual” 
marks of intentionality is predicated on the traditional identification of intentionality 
with opaque intentionality. Our three-fold distinction provides those like Alston, 
who are externalists about perceptual experience, with a way to maintain that the 
appearing relation is intentional after all because it is transparently intentional. Con-
sequently, these externalists can parry the objection that their account of perceptual 
experience verges on the contradictory in accepting (i) that perceptual experience 
is intentional in the sense of being about, or directed at, something, and (ii) that 
perceptual experience is referentially and existentially transparent. For although (i) 
and (ii) would be inconsistent if the only intentionality were opaque intentionality, 
they are consistent given our three-fold distinction.23
INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL CAUSATION
A conception of mental causation motivating internalism may be summarized as 
follows. Only if the mental states of a person supervene solely on her internal bodily 
states can these mental states play a causal (or causal-explanatory) role in bringing 
about (or causally explaining) her behavior. For the causal powers of a person’s 
mental states supervene solely on her intrinsic properties: a person’s mental states 
have causal powers if and only if the mental states of any molecule-for-molecule 
duplicate of hers would also have those causal powers. Since the mental states of 
a person play a causal role in bringing about her behavior, since mental states can 
play this role only if they supervene solely on her internal bodily states, and since 
putative transparent and translucent intentional states do not supervene in this way, 
they are not mental states. 
A proponent of this conception of mental causation may then propose factoring 
out and deeming as mental some narrowly individuated components of these states, 
components that do supervene solely on our bodily states. 
Versions and variations of this argument have been articulated by a number of 
philosophers24 and criticized by a number of others.25 The general strategy that I 
favor in response is to argue in a fundamentally Burgean spirit against the internal-
ist tenet that mental states can play a causal (or causal-explanatory) role only if 
they supervene solely on internal bodily states. As Burge points out, psychology, 
like other special sciences (e.g., astronomy, geology, physiology, and the like), 
studies “patterns of causation between entities and other entities in their >normal 
environments,’” and as a result, its “explanatory kinds are individuated in a way 
that presupposes such relations” (1989, 316). Moreover:
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Because the kinds recognized by these sciences are individuated by refer-
ence to patterns in a normal environment that reaches beyond the surfaces of 
individuals typed by those kinds, the kinds are not in general supervenient 
on the constituents of those individuals. It follows that the causal powers 
relevant to type individuating the explanatory kinds of a special science need 
not be “locally supervenient” on causal powers recognized by sciences that 
deal with underlying constituents. (Ibid., 317)
The fundamental issue here is where we think “real” causation goes on. If we 
think that mental causation is really nothing more than a kind of (internal) physi-
ological causation, then one will naturally be inclined to accept the internalist tenet 
that mental states can play a causal role in bringing about behavior only if they 
supervene solely on internal bodily states. But worth noting in this connection is that 
it no more follows from (i) the fact that physiological causal processes are required 
for the occurrence of mental states that (ii) “real” mental causation is physiological 
causation, than it follows from (iii) the fact that micro-physical causal processes 
are required for the occurrence of physiological states that (iv) “real” physiological 
causation is micro-physical causation.26 
Adequately addressing these issues about causation would take us well beyond 
the scope of this paper.27 Suffice it to say here that if transparent and translucent 
intentional states are causally efficacious mental states, then it is false that mental 
causation is nothing more than a kind of (internal) physiological causation. Con-
versely, if it is true that mental causation is nothing more than a kind of (internal) 
physiological causation, then it is false that transparent and translucent intentional 
states are causally efficacious mental states. In the latter case, transparent and 
translucent intentional states are either not mental or else are mental but not caus-
ally efficacious and hence epiphenomenal.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper had two primary aims. The first was to show how, from an externalist 
perspective, we may draw a three-fold distinction between transparent, translucent, 
and opaque intentionality. The second was to critically explore some important 
consequences that follow from granting (i) that there are transparent and trans-
lucent intentional states, and (ii) that these intentional states are genuine mental 
states.Now that we have explicated the distinction and explored some of these 
consequences, many, particularly those of an internalist bent, may opt to “tollens” 
where externalists will “ponens.” Even so, I think it fair to say that, given the way 
that analytic philosophers have traditionally identified intentionality with opaque 
intentionality, new and interesting avenues of inquiry are made possible by deploy-
ing the distinction drawn in this paper. For as we have seen herein, this distinction 
is one that makes a difference in a number of significant ways. 
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ENDNOTES
1. Note that I write of three kinds of intentionality with regard to mental states themselves, 
not just with regard to ascriptions of these states. An anonymous referee for this journal 
points out that internalists would take issue with this, claiming that it is the ascriptions 
that have these kinds of intentionality, not the states themselves. Though internalists 
might indeed make this objection, I am not assuming the truth of internalism, but rather 
exploring intentionality from an externalist perspective according to which at least some 
mental states themselves are intentional whereas their ascriptions are intensional. Cor-
responding to the three kinds of intentionality distinguished here that pertain to mental 
states, we may also distinguish, on my externalist view, three kinds of intensionality that 
pertain to the ascriptions of these states. In this connection, see the discussion in Fine 
(1989) concerning intensionality and hyper-intensionality; I thank a second anonymous 
referee for this reference. 
2. As Crane puts it: “Seeing seems to be a paradigm case of the direction of the mind on 
an object” (1998a, 819).
3. One can accept Ryle’s insightful point here without, of course, accepting his behaviorism 
also. Note that behaviorism is a form of internalism.
4. A qualification is needed here: the object that one sees exists or has existed. This quali-
fication is needed to cover time lags between the reflection or emission of light from an 
object and its being processed by a subject’s visual system. 
5. Kim (1993) defends a version of internalism, and so would count seeing not as a genuine 
mental state but as a hybrid state. His point here about seeing a tree requiring the tree to 
exist, however, is independent of his internalism. 
6. Advocates of the Causal Theory of Perception, such as Gerald Vision (1997), would add 
that the object must not only exist, but also be a cause of the state of seeing.
7. See Kim (1993) for a discussion of this point.
8. See Goodman (1976) and Elgin (1983) for an account of fictive language that does not 
commit us ontologically to fictive objects or fictive facts. 
9. Elgin (1985), in her impressive article “Translucent Belief,” was the first, as far as I 
know, to use the expression “translucent” in a philosophical discussion. As Elgin explains: 
“The conviction that the disjunction ‘transparent or opaque’ exhausts our options strikes 
me as mistaken. For many ascriptions of belief, neither construal is satisfactory. An in-
termediate position is wanted—one in which due attention is paid both to the words that 
are the medium of reference and to the things that are the objects of reference. I suggest 
then that we extend the metaphor and say that ascriptions of belief are neither typically 
transparent nor opaque, but translucent. A medium is literally translucent if it transmits 
light, but diffuses it in such a way that the outlines of objects cannot be clearly discerned. 
Correspondingly, a linguistic construction is metaphorically translucent if it transmits 
reference, but in such a way that the limits on paraphrase are not obvious” (1985, 75). 
For Elgin, a belief is typically (in my terms) existentially transparent or de re; as she puts 
it in one of her examples, “Sam cannot plausibly be said to believe that kangaroos are 
carnivores without its committing him to the existence of kangaroos and carnivores” (ibid., 
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83). But though typically existentially transparent, a belief (on Elgin’s theory) is not typi-
cally referentially transparent in my sense, namely, in the sense that the ascription of such 
a state admits of (any) substitution of co-referring terms without change in truth-value. 
Elgin offers an account where some, but not all, substitutions are permissible. Though I 
am very sympathetic to Elgin’s account of belief, nothing in the account of translucent 
intentional states that I present in this paper commits me to holding Elgin’s particular 
account of belief translucence. 
10. A pertinent question that may be raised here is whether there are (or can be) cases of 
intentional states that involve a different kind of translucency: namely, where existential 
opacity and referential transparency are co-instantiated. Perhaps the following would be 
such a case: suppose Sally is visually hallucinating her dead grandfather, and suppose for 
the sake of argument that this state is intentional. The ascription of such a state to her is, let’s 
suppose, existentially opaque. If the ascription of this state is also referentially transparent in 
that co-referring terms for “her dead grandfather” (e.g., “her grandmother’s husband,” etc.) 
can be substituted in “Sally is visually hallucinating her dead grandfather” without change 
in truth-value, then this intentional state is translucent in that it is opaque in one respect 
but transparent in another. Consequently, we may wish to distinguish between two kinds of 
translucency which we could call translucent de re and translucent non-de re respectively: 
a translucent de re intentional state (e.g., visual factive seeing) is existentially transparent 
but referentially opaque, whereas a translucent non-de re intentional state (e.g., (perhaps) 
certain cases of visual hallucination) is existentially opaque but referentially transparent. 
Hereafter, whenever I use the expression “translucent” in this paper it will be in the sense 
of “translucent de re” unless otherwise specified, and when discussing intentional translu-
cency, my focus will be on translucent de re intentional states. I intend to more fully discuss 
translucent non-de re states elsewhere.
11. In the objectual sense, “to know” is equivalent to the French “connaître” and to the 
German “kennen.” In the factive sense, “to know” is equivalent to the French “savoir” and 
to the German “wissen.” For an account of factive knowledge and other factive attitudes, 
see Williamson (2000).
12. See Russell (1997).
13. If we take propositions to be Russellian, however, belief de dicto cannot supervene solely 
on contemporaneous bodily states when extra-bodily physical objects act as constituents of 
the proposition.
14. Of course, Quine (1977) rejected the very ascriptions of transparent intentional states he 
explored and accepted in Quine (1966). I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for 
reminding me of this point. Howbeit, the account in Quine (1966) is interesting in its own 
right. In this connection, see Crawford (2002).
15. Though we have only covered one kind of propositional attitude, namely belief, the 
points made above may be extended mutatis mutandis to other propositional attitudes. 
16. See, for instance, chapter 11 of Chisholm (1957) for a classic discussion of these theses. 
Cf. the discussion of these theses in Crane (1998b) and in Bealer (1993).
17. As Crane points out, Brentano’s claim that intentionality is what distinguishes mental from 
physical phenomena is a distinction “among the data of consciousness, not among entities in 
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the world: among these data, mental phenomena are those which exhibit intentionality, and 
physical phenomena are those which do not” (1998a, 817). Crane also notes, however, that “in 
analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, Brentano’s distinction came to 
be interpreted as a distinction between entities in the world. This was chiefly because of this 
period’s prevailing realism” (ibid., 817–818). An anonymous referee for this journal alerted me 
to the excellent discussion of this point in chapter 1 of Bell (1991).
18. Cf. Bealer (1993). 
19. For an interesting discussion and criticism of Sellars’s conception of intentionality, see 
McDowell (1998). Note that I do not dispute that Sellars, for instance in Sellars (1963b, 
1964), also held that intentionality is nonrelational because, as an anonymous referee for 
this journal puts it, “a relational construal doesn’t capture the connection between the indi-
vidual that’s in the intentional state and that state’s content.” In response, let me make two 
points. First, this second kind of argument suggested by the referee seems to presuppose an 
internalism which, from the point of view of an externalist, is question-begging. Second, 
this second argument is not consistent with the first, if it posits the sort of contents that the 
first rejects. 
20. In this connection, an anonymous referee of this journal asked how there can be a 
phenomenon in this world some of which is relational and some of which is not. By “rela-
tional” I presume the referee has in mind the notion of existential transparency. Answering 
this question would take us well beyond the scope of this paper, which is not primarily 
concerned with how this is possible but with the philosophical consequences that ensue if 
this is possible. Let me, however, make the following two points. First, that intentionality is 
sometimes relational and sometimes not is arguably what makes it a unique phenomenon; if 
so, one shouldn’t expect to find non-intentionality-involving analogies that will illuminate 
this phenomenon. Second, if one cannot accept that intentionality is sometimes relational 
and sometimes not, two options are available: (i) accept the traditional identification of 
intentionality with opaque intentionality and thereby hold that intentionality is never rela-
tional, or (ii) accept a strong externalism that rejects opaque intentionality and thereby hold 
that genuine intentionality is always relational. One of the goals of this paper is to explore 
a middle course between (i) and (ii).
21. An anonymous referee for this journal (i) asks why I attribute to Quine the view that 
mental states supervene solely on bodily states, and (ii) claims that it seems entirely within 
the spirit of Quine’s views to accept a global or broad supervenience thesis. With regard to 
(i), I attribute this view to him because Quine (1998) clearly holds it. His claim that “one’s 
command of language, one’s understanding of language, one’s dispositions to respond, 
indeed one’s very thoughts, cannot differ from one moment to another without some dif-
ference, however undetectable, in the states of one’s physical organism” clearly articulates 
a commitment to local supervenience, not to broad or global supervenience. For on a broad 
or global supervenience thesis, one’s thoughts (etc.) could “differ from one moment to 
another without some difference, however undetectable, in the states of one’s physical 
organism.” With regard to (ii), I must strongly beg to differ, for not only is his response to 
Alston predicated on a commitment to internalism (and hence local supervenience), but so 
too are his well-known commitments to methodological behaviorism and token physicalism 
(among other things). See for instance, chapters 3 and 4 of Quine (1990), and chapter 8 of 
Quine (1995).
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22. The Theory of Appearing is an account of the perceptual experience of objects or concrete 
particulars, not of facts or states of affairs.
23. Alston has indicated to me in personal communication that he endorses the three-fold 
distinction drawn in this paper.
24. Prominent examples include Kim (1993), Fodor (1981, 1987), Stich (1983), and the 
Churchlands (1983).
25. See, for instance, Van Gulick (1989, 1993), Stalnaker (1989), Burge (1986, 1989, 1993), 
and Yablo (1997).
26. As Burge (ibid.) notes: “Few would advance the view that atomic or quantum processes 
are where the “real” causation goes on in physiology. Is there any strong ground for think-
ing that the “true nature” of causation involving psychological events is better revealed in 
physiology than in psychology?”
27. See Van Gulick (1989, 1993) and Burge (1989, 1993) for useful discussions of these 
issues.
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